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Abstract 
We investigate the effects of urban and rural populations and area sizes on the expenditures 
of the prefecture-level local government.  We found the following three results.  The first 
relates to the expenditure for urban populations.  At around 220,000 people, per capita local 
government expenditure is minimized in our simulation.  The second is that the expenditure 
for rural populations is proportional to the population size.  The third finding is that the 
expenditure in accordance with the areas is also proportional to the area size.  This cost 
structure is the reason why China’s recent rapid urbanization increases prefectural 
government’s fiscal distress. 
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1. Introduction 
China has five layers of government including the central government.  Each 
level of government, except the central government, receives financial transfers from the 
higher ranks of government and distributes the financial transfers to the lower levels of 
government.  This system has operated since China’s national foundation.  As for the tax 
collection system, the tax contracting system changed to the tax sharing system in 1994.  
In addition to these tax collecting and intergovernmental financial transfer systems, there 
is another set of financial resources for each level of government, for example, several 
kinds of charges or rental fees.  These are extrabudgetary revenues and these finance the 
extrabudgetary expenditures for each level of government.  There are several studies and 
explanations of this complex system.  Ahmad (1997) reviews this system including its 
history, Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) summarize recent reforms to the system and 
Man (2011) focuses on the local financial system. 
Recently, urbanization in China has been rapid and nationwide.  This trend has 
induced additional demand for public expenditure at each level of local government.  
Most prefectural governments face financial problems.  Tsui (2005) investigated the 
effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on the equalization of fiscal expenditures 
across counties.  To remove or reduce such financial distress, several researchers have 
suggested several kinds of reforms of local government fiscal systems or 
intergovernmental transfer systems; for example, the World Bank (2007) discussed the 
reforms to China’s tax system and intergovernmental fiscal system and transfer totally 
and Bahl (2011) examined decentralization and revenue assignment. 
However, most studies have proposed changes to the intergovernmental financial 
transfer system or tax revenue systems.  Few of them mention the adequacy of the five-
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layer government system or optimal level or size of local government or local 
government’s roles in providing public goods or services.  Prefecture populations vary 
from 7,000 to 2,239,000 and prefecture areas vary from 86 km2 to 198,318 km2.1  Some 
prefectures consist only of farmers and others have relatively large urban populations.  
Additionally, there are some prefectural governments in metropolitan areas, including 
Tianjin and Shanghai.  In such cases, it might be impossible to develop a reform that 
maintains the sizes or systems of prefectures.  In this paper, to evaluate the adequacy of 
the five-layer local government system, we investigate the efficient scale of prefectures 
from a minimizing government expenditures viewpoint, using data from 2037 prefectures, 
which excludes some prefectures within metropolitan areas and missing observations. 
Following several previous studies, we consider whether local government 
expenditures are determined by local population and area size.  Most prefectures, however, 
are composed of both urban and rural areas, so we assume that local government 
expenditures depend on urban and rural populations and area size.  We also assume that 
the total amount of government expenditures is determined by a quartic function of each 
factor.  This assumption corresponds to the assumption that per capita expenditures is a 
cubic function.  The reason why we assume a cubic function for per capita expenditures 
is that several previous studies assumed a U-shaped function for per capita expenditures 
for several public services or costs.  Additionally, by allowing a nonsymmetrical U-
shaped function for per capita expenditures in levels to capture the asymmetric marginal 
effects below and above the lowest (optimal) point, we assume a cubic function.2  In the 
                                                     
1 These population and area data are minimums and maximums in the sample used in this paper. 
2  Some researchers overcome this problem by logarithmic transformation of per capita 
expenditures and explanatory factors and a quadratic function, which is symmetric around the 
minimum point. 
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estimation process, we find too much variation in per capita expenditures even when we 
control several factors, so we apply a quantile regression approach to the data.  From the 
estimated results, we analyze the efficient scales for urban and rural populations and area 
size. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we conduct a short literature survey 
on the efficient scale for local government or several kinds of public services or costs.  In 
Section 3, we introduce our econometric model to analyze aggregated prefectural 
expenditures.  In Section 4, we conduct OLS estimation and diagnostics on the residuals.  
In Section 5, we present the results of a quantile regression.  We simulate the efficient 
scales for urban and rural populations and areas in Section 6.  Finally, we discuss some 
shortcomings of our paper and possibilities for future research in Section 7. 
2. Literature Survey of Efficient Scale of Local Governments 
Oates (1972) examined fiscal federalism and several subsequent studies 
investigated systems of local public finance.  Some of these studies, such as Alesina and 
Spolare (2003), examined the optimal size of governments or nations.  Others authors 
have discussed the optimal combination or layers of local governments, for example, 
Hochman, Pines and Thisse (1995) and Baleiras (2001).3  To investigate the real size of 
local governments, we must first examine the cost structures of local public services.  The 
empirical analysis of Shelton (2007), which investigated the determinants of central and 
local governments’ total expenditure and expenditures on some specific items using 
                                                     
3 King and Ma (2000) investigated theoretically the relationship between congestion and the size 
of local government. 
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international data, focused on the optimal allocation of service provisions among central 
and local governments. 
Many papers have examined the cost structure or efficiency of providing local 
public services.  Most of these studies attempt to investigate the cost structures of specific 
public services such as the police or fire department, schools, sewage or water supply 
services and so on.  For example, Hirsch (1959) investigated total expenditure on police 
services, refuse collection, fire protection and education services.  He fitted a quadratic 
function of population and found inverted U-shaped relationships with various kinds of 
expenditures, which suggests the existence of economies of scale.  Bodkin and Conklin 
(1971) conducted a similar analysis on per capita local public expenditures.  They found 
a U-shaped relationship between per capita total expenditure and population, but did not 
find U-shaped relationships with some specific public expenditure items.  Beaton (1974) 
fitted linear regression equations to the cost of police services by population size of cities.  
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) also fitted simple log-linear equations to several outputs 
of public services.  Craig (1987), Craig and Heikkila (1989) and Edwards (1990) 
introduced congestion functions and estimated the degrees of congestion in providing 
public safety and others.  Ladd (1992) estimated a piecewise linear function and obtained 
asymmetric U-shaped cost function.  Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005) took a similar approach.  
Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero (1995) also found asymmetric relationships between 
school size and expenditures.  Several studies have fitted quadratic functions to the cost 
structure of local public services: Hirsch (1965) for refuse collections, Knapp (1982) for 
crematoria and Tao and Yuan (2005) for public elementary schools.  Furthermore, in 
relation to other aspects of cost structures, Ladd (1994) and Nelson (1992) investigated 
the relationship between population growth and counties’ expenditures.  Carruthers and 
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Ulfarsson (2003) investigated the effects of population growth and changes in population 
densities from the aspect of urban sprawl.  Duncombe and Yinger (1993) extended this 
type of analysis to multiple types of public services and estimated the degree of 
economies of scope.  Au and Henderson (2006) focused on the agglomeration effect of 
cities in China and estimated an inverted U-shaped function for productivity.4 
When we estimate the cost structure of specific public services, we cannot 
determine the optimal size of the local government.  However, this type of research 
provides evidence regarding which level or layer of government should supply police or 
other specific public services.  When we estimate the total expenditure function, we can 
directly investigate the efficient scale of the local government.  However, this type of 
analysis is limited by the existing roles of local government within the current central–
local government system. 
In this paper, we investigate the efficient scale of prefectural government; thus, 
our paper adopts the latter type of analysis.  According to Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao 
(2011), prefectural government mainly provides services related to public security, social 
security and health care within the current five-layer government system in China.  As 
for the prefectural government’s expenditure shares, the top four items are capital 
investment, education, government administration and public security.  We cannot obtain 
each prefecture’s detailed fiscal expenditures.  This is another reason why we cannot 
apply the former type of studies to some specific public services.  In this paper, we 
assume that total prefectural expenditures also have U-shaped cost structures as do 
specific expenditures, e.g., public security, education or government administration. 
                                                     
4 Additionally, Andrews, Duncombe and Yinger (2002) conducted a literature survey of 
economies of scale in public education provision. 
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3. Econometric Model for Aggregated Data 
The details of local government expenditures are not available.  We only have 
budgetary expenditures and extrabudgetary expenditures in total.  Therefore, we 
investigate the determinants of total budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures (G).  We 
assume this total expenditure consists of three components: expenditure for urban 
population (GU), expenditure for rural population (GA) and expenditure related to area size 
(GS): 
 
G=GU+GA+. GS. 
 
Then, each of these three components is a quartic function of each factor:  
 
GU=α0+α1UPop+α2UPop
2+α3UPop
.3α4UPop
.4, 
 
GA=β0+β1RPop+β2RPop
2+β3RPop
3+β4RPop
4, 
 
GS=γ0+γ1Area+γ2Area
2+γ3Area
3+γ4Area
4, 
 
where UPop , RPop  and Area  are urban population, rural population and area size, 
respectively.  We can write the equation for per capita expenditures as follows: 
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G
Pop
=
𝛼0
Pop
+𝛼1
UPop
Pop
+𝛼2
UPop2
Pop
+𝛼3
UPop3
Pop
+𝛼4
UPop4
Pop
+ 
 𝛽1
Pop
+ 𝛽1
RPop
Pop
+𝛽2
RPop2
Pop
+𝛽3
RPop3
Pop
+𝛽4
RPop4
Pop
+  
𝛾0
Pop
+𝛾1
Area
Pop
+𝛾2
Area2
Pop
+𝛾3
Area3
Pop
+𝛾4
Area4
Pop
, 
 
and this equation can be rewritten as 
 
G
Pop
=
𝛿
Pop
+𝛼1
UPop
Pop
+𝛼2
UPop2
Pop
+𝛼3
UPop3
Pop
+𝛼4
UPop4
Pop
        + 𝛽1
RPop
Pop
+𝛽2
RPop2
Pop
+𝛽3
RPop3
Pop
+𝛽4
RPop4
Pop
             + 𝛾1
Area
Pop
+𝛾2
Area2
Pop
+𝛾3
Area3
Pop
+𝛾4
Area4
Pop
 
 
using the following reparameterization: 
 
𝛿 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0 + 𝛾0. 
 
The relation between total population (Pop) and urban and rural populations, 
 
Pop=UPop+RPop, 
 
leads to 
 
1 =
UPop
Pop
+
RPop
Pop
 
 
8 
 
and we can rewrite the equation and add the error term as 
 
G
Pop
=𝛼1+𝛿
1
Pop
+𝛼2
UPop2
Pop
+𝛼3
UPop3
Pop
+𝛼4
UPop4
Pop
 
                                      +(𝛽1 − 𝛼1)
RPop
Pop
+𝛽2
RPop2
Pop
+𝛽3
RPop3
Pop
 +𝛽4
RPop4
Pop
     
                                                                             +𝛾1
Area
Pop
+𝛾2
Area2
Pop
+𝛾3
Area3
Pop
+𝛾4
Area4
Pop
+u. 
 
Furthermore, we introduce a reparameterization of 
 
ϕ = 𝛽1 − 𝛼1 
 
and an additional factor to determine the expenditures: number of towns or villages in 
each prefecture (NTowns).  Finally, we obtain the estimation equation: 
 
G
Pop
=𝛼1+θ
NTowns
Pop
+𝛿
1
Pop
+𝛼2
UPop2
Pop
+𝛼3
UPop3
Pop
+𝛼4
UPop4
Pop
 
                        +ϕ
RPop
Pop
+𝛽2
RPop2
Pop
+𝛽3
RPop3
Pop
+𝛽4
RPop4
Pop
                                    (1) 
 +𝛾1
Area
Pop
+𝛾2
Area2
Pop
+𝛾3
Area3
Pop
+𝛾4
Area4
Pop
+u . 
 
The reason why we introduce NTowns as an additional explanatory variable is that each 
prefecture makes fiscal transfers to towns or villages within the prefectures and each 
town or village has fixed costs associated with the provision of their public services.  In 
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the following sections, we estimate this equation (1) by OLS or another estimation 
method. 
4. Data and OLS Estimation 
In this section, we report the estimation results of equation (1) by OLS.  Before 
exploring the results, we describe the data used in this paper.  We use data for 2037 
prefectures in the estimation.  The coverage and sample size in each province or 
municipality are shown in Table 1.  The coverage of our sample is 71.3% because we 
delete the data of prefectures within metropolitan areas and some missing data exist.  We 
collect data for urban and rural populations and area size from the 2009 China County 
Statistical Yearbook and prefectures’ budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures5 from 
the 2009 National Prefecture, City, County Fiscal Statistical Book.  Summary statistics 
of the data are shown in Table 2.  The measurement units of the data are as follows: G is 
in 10,000 yuan, Pop, UPop and RPop are in 10,000 people, Area is in square kilometers 
and NTowns is in number of towns.  Table 2 also shows the summary statistics for the 
transformed data. 
Table 3 shows the results of the OLS estimation.  Some coefficients are estimated 
as being statistically significant, whereas others are insignificant.  The coefficient of 
determination (R2) is 0.49.  This is relatively high for this type of cross-sectional data 
analysis.  However, tests for heteroskedasticity (LM-hetero) and misspecification 
(RESET) imply misspecification or crucial heteroskedasticity.  Jarque–Bera’s test for 
nonnormality of the error terms implies that the distribution of error terms cannot be 
                                                     
5 This total expenditure includes budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures and expenditures of 
governmental funds in each prefecture. 
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normal.  Robust t-values are estimated t-values calculated as White’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors.  The calculated standard t-values and robust t-values are 
different, so these results also suggest the existence of heteroskedasticity in the error 
terms.  Then, we plot the fitted values of the regression equation and residuals in Figure 
1 to check the distribution of the error terms.  This figure implies that the error terms are 
asymmetric and heteroskedastic.  Some of the residuals imply the existence of outliers.  
A similar result is found in Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005, Figure 2, p. 354).  They dealt with 
this type of problem by applying a piecewise linear regression model.  In this paper, we 
apply a quantile regression in the next section. 
5. Quantile Regression Approach 
A well-known text on quantile regression is Koenker (2005).  This method is 
usually applied when the error term has heteroskedasticity with respect to the levels of 
the dependent variables.  In this paper, we apply this method to multiple regression 
models with a quartic function.  Details of this procedure are available in Koenker (2005); 
however, to summarize this method we assume a linear regression model with an error 
term as follows: 
 
y𝑖 = X𝑖
′β + ε𝑖,,          𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑁. 
 
When we estimate the OLS estimator, we minimize the following objective function: 
 
S(β) = ∑(y𝑖 − X𝑖
′β )2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 . 
 
11 
As for the quantile regression, we set a quantile 𝜇𝑞 and q as follows: 
 
q = Pr(y𝑖 ≤ 𝜇𝑞) =  𝐹𝑦(𝜇𝑞), 
 
where 𝐹𝑦(𝜇𝑞) is the distribution function of y𝑖.  Of course, the inverse function of 
𝐹𝑦(𝜇𝑞) means 
 
𝜇𝑞 =  𝐹𝑦
−1(q). 
 
If we assume y𝑖 = X𝑖
′β + ε𝑖,  this inverse function could be rewritten in terms of 
conditional probability as follows: 
 
𝜇𝑞(𝑋) =  𝐹𝑦|𝑋
−1(q). 
 
To estimate β𝑞 in a quantile regression requires minimization of the following objective 
function with respect to β𝑞: 
 
S(β𝑞) = ∑ 𝑞|y𝑖 − X𝑖
′β𝑞|
𝑁
𝑖: y𝑖≥X𝑖
′β
+ ∑ (1 − 𝑞)|y𝑖 − X𝑖
′β𝑞|
𝑁
𝑖: y𝑖<X𝑖
′β
.  
 
This is a variation of least absolute deviation (LAD) estimation.  There exist various 
methods to estimate the standard errors of the estimated parameters.  In this paper, we use 
the LAD command in TSP version 5.0.  This command estimates the standard errors of 
the coefficient using a bootstrap method with 500 replications. 
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The results of the quantile regression when we estimate equation (1) with q = 
0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 are shown in Table 4.  The results show that some coefficients 
are not statistically significant at the 5% level in all settings of q, so we remove the 
corresponding variables from the equation and reestimate the model.  The results are 
shown in Table 5 as the selected model.  This table shows the OLS estimation results 
using the same list of explanatory variables.  In the next section, using these results, we 
simulate the effects of UPop, RPop and Area on 𝐺 𝑃𝑜𝑝⁄ .  This type of simulation makes 
the robustness of the existence of the efficient scales. 
6. Simulation for Efficient Scales 
To simulate the effects of changes in the explanatory variables in the multiple 
regression equation, we should control all explanatory variables other than the variable 
of focus.  In this section, we investigate the effects of UPop, RPop and Area on 𝐺 𝑃𝑜𝑝⁄ .  
For the former two populations, we assume a situation in which all the people in the 
prefectures live either in the urban or in the rural area: Pop = UPop or Pop = RPop. 
First, we simulate the effects of urban population assuming Pop = UPop and 
setting the area and number of towns or villages under each prefecture at their average 
values: Area = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and NTowns = 𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅.  Then, we calculate the effect of urban 
population on the per capita government expenditures corresponding to the changes in 
population as follows: 
 
𝐺
𝑃𝑜𝑝
̂
(𝑃𝑜𝑝) = 𝛼1̂ + 𝜃
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛿
1
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛼2̂𝑃𝑜𝑝 + 𝛼3̂𝑃𝑜𝑝
2 + 𝛼4̂𝑃𝑜𝑝
3 
+𝛾1̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾2̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾3̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾4̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
, 
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where the parameters with hats are estimates and the variables with upper bars are average 
values.  While the distribution of total populations ranges between zero and 2,250,000 
people (Figure 2), urban populations are distributed between zero and 620,000 people 
(Figure 3).  Therefore, we figure the calculated per capita expenditures from 2,550 to 
400,000 people in Figure 4.  From this figure, we can observe that there exist the points 
to minimize the per capita expenditures in all the regression results: OLS, quantile 
regressions with q = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9.  The calculated points that minimize per 
capita expenditures are as follows: 
 
  OLS  : 212,000 
  q = 0.1  : 264,500 
  q = 0.25  : 243,500 
  q = 0.5  : 237,500 
  q = 0.75  : 210,000 
  q = 0.9  : 170,500. 
 
There exists a variation according to the setting of q, but it is located between 170,000 
and 270,000 people.  In particular, for the q = 0.5 and OLS cases, the points are located 
mainly around 220,000 people.  These results suggest that there is a most efficient scale 
for the urban population and it is located around 220,000 people.  If q goes to zero 
asymptotically, this method becomes similar to that of corrected least square (COLS) in 
14 
econometrics for efficiency and productivity.6  Therefore, if we assume that the case of q 
= 0.1 is the lower 10% efficient prefectures results, the most efficient prefectures 
minimize their expenditures when their urban populations are equal to or greater than 
264,500 people. 
Second, we simulate the effects of the rural population assuming Pop = APop 
and setting the area and number of towns or villages in each prefecture at their average 
values: Area = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and NTowns = 𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅.  Then, we calculate the effect of the 
rural population on per capita government expenditures when the population changes as 
follows: 
 
𝐺
𝑃𝑜𝑝
̂
(𝑃𝑜𝑝) = 𝛼1̂ + 𝜃
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛿
1
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ ?̂? + 𝛽2̂𝑃𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽3̂𝑃𝑜𝑝
2 + 𝛽4̂𝑃𝑜𝑝
3 
+𝛾1̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾2̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾3̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾4̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
. 
 
Rural population distributes between zero and 1,950,000 people (Figure 5).  Therefore, 
we figure the calculated per capita expenditures from 10,000 to 1,500,000 people in 
Figure 6.  In this figure, some simulated lines cross in the range between 10,000 and 
100,000 people; this phenomenon is caused by fixing the number of towns or villages 
under each prefecture at their average values, Area = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and NTowns = 𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 
with estimated coefficients for the higher-order quartic equation being statistically 
insignificant.  Therefore, we do not investigate small rural population cases.  When the 
population is 100,000 and over, per capita expenditures are slightly decreasing when q = 
                                                     
6 Winsten (1957) first proposed this method.  It is referred to as COLS in the econometrics 
of efficiency and productivity literature; for example, Fried et al. (2008, p. 35) explains 
this method. 
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0.1, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 and slightly increasing when q = 0.95, and flat in the OLS case.  
These results suggest that government expenditures for rural populations vary in 
proportion to population size.  Furthermore, we should pay attention to the simulated level 
of expenditures.  Comparing the simulated expenditures for rural populations with those 
for urban populations, we see the former are much smaller than the latter.  For example, 
the former are about 1300 yuan, whereas the latter do not fall below 5000 yuan in the q = 
0.5 case.  This means that the prefectural government that governs a rural population 
operates cost-effectively. 
Third, we simulate the effects of area holding the ratios of urban population and 
rural population to total population at their average values: 
APop
Pop⁄ =
APop
Pop⁄
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
 and 
UPop
Pop⁄ =
UPop
Pop⁄
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
, and the number of towns or villages in each prefecture at their 
average values, NTowns = 𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅.  Then, we calculate the effect of area on per capita 
government expenditures corresponding to changes in area as follows: 
 
𝐺
𝑃𝑜𝑝
̂
(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎) = 𝛼1̂ + 𝜃
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛿
1
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛼2̂
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛼3̂
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛼4̂
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
                                         +?̂?
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛽2̂
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛽3̂
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
  + 𝛽4̂
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
    
                +𝛾1̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾2̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾3̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛾4̂
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
. 
 
Area is distributed between zero and over 20,000 km2 (Figure 7).  Therefore, we calculate 
per capita expenditures from 389 km2 to 16,000 km2 in Figure 8.  The results indicate that 
16 
per capita expenditures are increasing slightly in all cases but at a slow rate.  These results 
suggest that government expenditures corresponding to area are determined in proportion 
to area size. 
7. Conclusion 
We investigated the effects of urban and rural populations and area size on the 
expenditures of the prefectural-level local government.  Throughout the empirical 
investigation, we found the following three results.  First, at around 220,000 people, per 
capita local government expenditure for urban populations has a minimum value in our 
simulation.  This can also be seen in the simulation results from the quantile regression.  
Second, expenditure for rural populations is proportional to population size.  Additionally, 
per capita expenditures are much lower than those for urban populations.  Third, 
expenditure corresponding to area is also proportional to area size.  The last two findings 
mean that the expenditures are proportional to population and area size when all the 
prefectural populations are rural.  If we consider these results from another viewpoint, 
China’s recent rapid urbanization has increased prefectural government expenditures 
substantially.  It has also caused fiscal distress among prefectural governments.  
Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) also discussed the present trend of land conversion from 
rural to urban use and the associated problems. 
It is of course impossible to stop the current urbanization trend in China.  
However, prefectures that are heavily urbanized should be divided into prefectures of 
efficient size, each of which consists of around 220,000 people, and rural populations.  
This is similar to the concept of the “garden city” in urban planning, which was examined 
by Ward (1992).  To consider the level of economic development, it should be called 
17 
“rural city.”7  Apart from metropolitan areas, the construction of rural cities from coast to 
coast should be the best way to control prefectural government expenditures.  However, 
this may contradict the findings of Au and Henderson (2006), which showed that more 
than half of Chinese cities are undersized from the viewpoint of agglomeration effects on 
workers’ productivity.  If further migration from rural areas to cities increases wages 
further, it is difficult to maintain the urban population in each prefecture at around 
220,000.  If the Chinese central or local governments cannot control migration, they 
should increase tax revenues or find other revenue sources to finance prefectural 
government expenditures.  Recent measures to reform resource-related taxation in China 
are an example of the search for new revenue sources. 
Finally, our study has some limitations.  First, as we explained in the introduction, 
we cannot investigate the efficient scales of specific public expenditures such as police 
and fire departments or water supply.  If we were able to investigate each type of 
expenditure, we could consider the assignment of public services among the five layers 
of government or the efficient structures of local government systems.  We could also 
investigate economies of scale in public expenditures for each item and economies of 
scope among several types of public expenditure.  For example, Drake and Simper (2002) 
emphasize the existence of economies of scope in public service expenditures.  The 
second remaining problem is a result of the quantile regression approach.  The results also 
shed light on the existence of the large difference in expenditure between governments of 
similar size but in prefectures with differences in terms of urban or rural populations and 
area size.  This means that some governments spend considerably more than others and 
                                                     
7  Chen et al. (2008) proposed the “compact city” for sustainable growth in China, 
focusing on land saving; thus, it is different from the concept of our “rural city.” 
18 
some spend considerably less.  Such differences should be investigated to identify the 
specific reason or factor for this by prefecture.  Additionally, if we obtain prefectural 
socioeconomic statistics, which were used by Gyimah-Brempong (1989) to examine the 
determinants of the cost of providing public safety, they could help identify the sources 
of variation in prefectural expenditures and provide the comparable efficiency ranking 
within similar size prefectures. 
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Table 1. Coverage of sample for each province or municipality 
Provinces and municipalities Sample Total Coverage 
Beijing Municipality 5 18 0.278  
Tianjin Municipality 4 16 0.250  
Hubei Province 138 172 0.802  
Shanxi Province 97 119 0.815  
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 81 101 0.802  
Liaoning Province 43 100 0.430  
Jilin Province 41 60 0.683  
Heilongjiang Province 65 128 0.508  
Shanghai Municipality 3 18 0.167  
Jiangsu Province 57 106 0.538  
Zhejiang Province 55 90 0.611  
Anhui Province 61 105 0.581  
Fijian Province 57 85 0.671  
Jiangxi Province 80 99 0.808  
Shandong Province 91 140 0.650  
Henan Province 107 159 0.673  
Hubei Province 66 103 0.641  
Hunan Province 84 122 0.689  
Guangdong Province 74 121 0.612  
Guangxi Province 81 109 0.743  
Hainan Province 16 20 0.800  
Changing Municipality 26 40 0.650  
Sichuan Province 139 181 0.768  
Guizot Province 76 88 0.864  
Yunnan Province 120 129 0.930  
Tibet Autonomous Region 72 73 0.986  
Shaanxi Province 86 107 0.804  
Gansu Province 75 86 0.872  
Qinghai Province 38 43 0.884  
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 13 22 0.591  
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 86 98 0.878  
Total 2037 2858 0.713  
Note 1: Total is the total number of county-level jurisdictions in 2009 reported by the 2010 China 
Statistical Yearbook. 
Note 2: Sample is the number of observations used in this paper and coverage is the coverage ratio 
of the “sample” to the “total.” 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Original data 
    
𝐺 
118863.8 104488.1 300 1504195 
𝑃𝑜𝑝 
47.31635 34.89929 0.7 223.9 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝 
38.76117 30.29445 0.1 193.6 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 
4294.808 9945.455 86 198318 
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠 
14.70201 7.995951 1 72 
Transformed 
data 
    
𝐺
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
3363.36 2814.228 34.09091 34087.64 
1
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
0.054245 0.10624 0.004466 1.42857 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
0.20093 0.14346 0 0.99342 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
0.79907 0.14346 0.006579 1 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
644.5605 4058.228 2.56667 85662.23 
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
0.5652 0.76666 0.031646 8.57143 
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Table 3. Estimation Results by OLS 
 Coefficient t-value Robust t-value 
Constant 19860.4 23.842 10.526 
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 1002.82 7.980 4.573 
1
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 115.802 0.090 0.005 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –1621.85 –13.424 –6.543 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 56.5807 10.917 5.849 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –0.57576 –9.4678 –5.485 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –19200.8 –18.218 –8.712 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 0.095896 0.006 0.003 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 0.084069 0.387 0.273 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –0.00066 –0.710 –0.637 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 0.178648 1.580 0.051 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –2.5E-06 –0.777 –0.021 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 2.58E-11 0.810 0.021 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –8.9E-17 –0.960 –0.024 
Adj R2 0.4987 
LM-hetero 85.507 
RESET 52.927 
Jarque–Bera 75719.2 
Note 1: Adj R2, LM-hetero, RESET and Jarque–Bera are adjusted R-squared, test for 
heteroskedasticity, RESET test with squared fitted values and Jarque–Bera test for normality. 
Note 2: Bold values mean statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4. Estimation Results by Quantile Regression: Full Model 
Quantiles 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 
Constant 
8437.364 10865.07 14691.87 18867.71 25474.17 
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
186.2419 200.8443 472.8929 1246.982 2323.414 
1
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
2790.369 2072.114 1612.773 –256.541 –2870.05 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
–582.815 –790.664 –1124.87 –1489.6 –2170.34 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
17.69066 25.17713 37.11554 52.52024 88.6423 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
–0.1602 –0.24401 –0.36007 –0.5324 –0.96903 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
–6867.2 –9253.76 –13284.8 –17565.5 –24829.6 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
–25.0469 –22.1984 –14.4934 –13.016 7.5451 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
0.27828 0.22899 0.12407 0.16248 0.016699 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
–0.00109 –0.00086 –0.00042 –0.00069 –0.00042 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
0.12069 0.29961 0.4339 0.43212 0.36434 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
–2.17E-06 –4.66E-06 –7.83E-06 –8.46E-06 –7.46E-06 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
8.35E-12 1.92E-11 4.93E-11 9.98E-11 8.28E-11 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 
1.17E-17 –5.10E-18 –9.84E-17 –3.44E-16 –2.85E-16 
Adj R2 0.46307 0.47224 0.48437 0.48294 0.47717 
Note 1: Adj R2 is adjusted R-squared. 
Note 2: Bold values mean statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5. Estimation Results by Quantile Regression: Selected Model 
Quantiles 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 OLS 
Constant 9865.556 12879.36 16433.2 19494.19 23919.46 19595.94 
𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 372.7542 310.7989 594.6125 1329.612 2163.313 980.2919 
1
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 2965.341 3612.943 1550.574 1299.058 –3512.63 5.34297 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –708.287 –1004.27 –1298.16 –1540.59 –1887.98 –1590.68 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 20.67388 32.16626 42.61537 53.8526 76.49473 55.56158 
𝑈𝑃𝑜𝑝4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –0.18161 –0.31268 –0.41115 –0.54328 –0.83928 –0.56619 
𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑝
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –9113.59 –12080.4 –15627.1 –18605.9 –22888.9 –18819.8 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 0.12268 0.18421 0.39747 0.27226 0.44509 0.19418 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎2
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –2.88E-06 –2.83E-06 –7.61E-06 –4.83E-06 –7.99E-06 –2.9E-06 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎3
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 1.73E-11 9.67E-12 4.85E-11 6.95E-11 8.22E-11 2.84E-11 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎4
𝑃𝑜𝑝
 –1.77E-17 8.49E-18 –9.67E-17 –2.65E-16 –2.77E-16 –9.6E-17 
R2 0.46899 0.4791 0.48777 0.48514 0.47876 0.50135 
Note 1: R2 is R-squared. 
Note 2: Bold values mean statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1. Fitted values and residuals 
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Figure 2. Histogram for “Pop” 
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Figure 3. Histogram for “Upop” 
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Figure 4. Urban population and local government expenditure 
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Figure 5. Histogram for “Apop” 
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Figure 6. Rural population and local government expenditure 
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Figure 7. Histogram for “Area”
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Figure 8. Area and local government expenditure 
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